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THE IMPACT OF THE TAX REDUCTION
ACT OF 1975
ON THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
JAMES C. COX
ARTHUR W. WRIGHT*
INTRODUCTION
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 (TRA)' changed two important
components of the income tax law which apply to petroleum
producers.' First, it repealed percentage depletion on a large propor-
tion of crude oil and natural gas output. 3 Second, it modified the cal-
culation and use of the foreign tax credit by U.S. international oil
companies.' These two changes are expected to increase the taxes
paid by petroleum producers, and therefore to reduce federal tax ex-
penditures on the petroleum industry. They may also affect market
variables such as the prices and outputs of crude oil and natural gas,
and investment in proved oil and gas reserves. These market effects
of TRA may, in turn, affect public policy objectives such as achieving
national independence in energy and increasing competition in pe-
troleum markets.
This article will examine the effects of the petroleum provisions
in TRA on federal tax revenues and other economic variables, and
then discuss the implications of those effects for the independence
and competition objectives of energy policy. Interactions with other
public policies concerning petroleum are also discussed. The partial
repeal of percentage depletion will be considered in section I. Section
II will examine the changes in the foreign tax credit. It is argued that
the changes in percentage depletion will significantly reduce federal
tax expenditures on the domestic petroleum industry. Those changes
also create incentives for reductions in the following domestic
economic variables: (1) crude oil and natural gas production; (2) in-
vestment in proved petroleum reserves; (3) market concentration in
crude oil and natural gas production; and (4) vertical integration in
the oil industry. Under present price-control policies, reductions in
* Associate Professors of Economics. respectively at the University of Mass-
achusetts and at Amherst. The authors wish to thank the following people for their
help in providing data and source references: Marcia Field, U.S. Treasury; Thomas
Vasquez and Michael Bird, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation; Tina
Goodnough, Tax Analyst and Advocates; and Nicholas Gal, American Petroleum Insti-
tute. The Federal Energy Administration provided financial support for the research
which underlies this article; however, the views expressed are solely those of the au-
thors.
' Pub. L. No. 94-12 (March 29, 1975).
Throughout this article, the term "petroleum" refers to crude oil and natural
3 Pub. L. No. 94-12, tit. V (March 29, 1975).
/d., tit. VI (March 29, 1975).
gas.
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domestic petroleum production will not affect crude oil prices but will
raise the prices of some refined products and intrastate natural gas; if
oil and gas prices were decontrolled, TRA would not affect the prices
of crude oil or refined products but would cause higher natural gas
prices. The effect of TRA on energy independence is ambiguous
under present policies; however, in a policy environment of no price
controls, TRA would reduce energy independence.
The changes in the foreign tax credit will raise relatively little
revenue, but will effectively remove a tax incentive to invest in foreign
rather than domestic petroleum. Those changes are not, however, an
effective response to the policy disputes over whether payments to
foreign producer countries are, in fact, royalties instead of income
taxes, and whether oil companies are avoiding taxes by transferring
income from consumer countries to producer countries through fic-
titious internal pricing..
I. PARTIAL REPEAL OF PERCENTAGE DEPLETION
ON OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION
This section has three parts. Subsection I.A. outlines the specific
provisions in TRA which apply to the percentage depletion allowance.
Subsection I.B. examines estimates of the "direct" revenue effects of
the bill, which include interactions between TRA and other provisions
of the tax law but do not encompass "indirect" revenue effects from
changes in market behavior induced by TRA. Finally, subsection I.C.
considers the changes in market variables which could occur as pro-
ducers adapt to the new tax law and which would indirectly affect
federal tax revenues.
A. Specific Provisions of TIM
Title V of TRA repeals the 22-percent percentage depletion al-
lowance on all oil and gas production for tax years ending after De-
cember 31, 1974, except for two exemptions. First, domestic natural
gas production meeting certain conditions will still qualify for percent-
age depletion under section 613 of the Internal Revenue Code. Sec-
ond, domestic producers and royalty owners who can qualify as "in-
dependents" will be permitted percentage depletion deductions ac-
cording to a schedule of maximum quantities and percentage rates
which gradually phases down to a minimum floor for 1984 and later
years. TRA does not change the tax treatment of "intangible drilling
costs" or "dry-hole costs," which can be expensed as incurred. 5
The natural gas exemption principally applies to domestic
natural gas produced under regulated or contractually fixed prices set
5 For a detailed discussion of percentage depletion and the expensing of intangi-
bles and dry-hole costs, see Agria, Special Tax Treatment of Mineral Industries, in THE
TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 77 (A. Harberger & M. Bailey eds. 1969).
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prior to December 31, 1974.6 In effect, it protects gas producers
against windfall losses due to increased federal taxes not foreseen
when the Federal Power Commission (FPC) set field prices' or when
producers signed long-term contracts with pipelines. Once regulated
•prices have been raised by the FPC, or the terms of contracts revised,
it is assumed that the tax changes introduced by TRA have been
taken into account and the exemption ends. Thus, over time the
natural gas exemption will diminish in importance, as the FPC adjusts
regulated field prices on existing production"' or existing contracts ex-
pire.
The exemption for independent producers has two principal
features: determination of eligibility; and calculation of the benefits
eligibility confers.° The major integrated oil companies lose percent-
age depletion entirely under TRA, because the independents' ex-
emption excludes any taxpayer involved in retailing petroleum
products'° or connected with refineries which (in the aggregate) pro-
cess more than 50,000 barrels of crude oil on any day during the tax
year." In addition, the exemption applies only to domestic crude oil
and natural gas; percentage depletion is therefore repealed on all
foreign production, of whith the major integrated oil companies ac-
count for the lion's share. All other taxpayers, no matter how much
petroleum they produce, qualify as independents and are thus eligible
to claim percentage depletion deductions."
While the independents' exemption continues the percentage
depletion allowance for qualifying taxpayers, the current method of
calculation differs from that under the previous section 613(b). Eligi-
ble taxpayers can claim percentage depletion on a maximum "deplet-
° INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 1 613A(b). This subsection also provides, in subparagraph
(I)(C), for continuation of the 22-percent depletion allowance on "any geothermal deposit in
the United States or in a possession of the United States which is determined to be a gas well
within the meaning of section 613(6)(1)(A).
The FPC has the power to regulate the natural gas industry, including fixing
reasonable rates and charges. 15 U.S.C. 1 717 et seq. (1970).
• The FPC recently raised permissible field prices for "old" natural gas (gas
committed to interstate pipelines before January I, 1973), ostensibly "to compensate
producers for increased taxes stemming from repeal of the depletion tax allowance last
year." Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1976, at 3, col. 2. The "compensation" was not really neces-
sary, because such gas would have qualified for the natural gas exemption; once the
higher prices take effect, of course, the exemption will end on "old" gas.
° INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 1 6 I3A(c).
'° Id. § 613A(d)(2).
"Id. 613A(d)(4).
12 "Independents' exemption" is a misnomer, insofar as the term "independent"
connotes "small producer." For example, 5 CCH 1976 STAND. FED, TAX REP.
1 3564E.05, at 42,217, refers to "small producers and royalty owners." In fact, all non-
retailers with at most minor refinery capacity—a category which includes a number of
very large producers of crude oil and natural gas—are eligible for the exemption.
The definition of a "retailer" of petroleum has already become an Issue in the
implementation of TRA. See 4 TAX NOTES, 'No. 6, at 15 (1976).
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able quantity" of crude oil and natural gas production per year," at
percentages of gross revenue prescribed in the bill." Natural gas pro-
duction is converted into crude-oil equivalents, in determining the
total depletable quantity of oil and gas, at the rate of 6,000 cubic feet
(6 Mcf) per barrel. 15 The gas/oil conversion factor is based on approx-
imate relative thermal content, not relative market value. The total
depletable quantity for 1975 is set at 2,000 barrels per day (bpd), or
730,000 barrels per year, of crude-oil equivalent, and it declines in
annual steps of 200 bpd until it reaches the floor of 1,000 bpd, or
365,000 barrels per year, for 1980 and subsequent years." While the
limit on output eligible for percentage depletion is being phased
down, the percentage rate applied to gross revenue remains constant
at the previous level of 22 percent. Then for 1981-1983 the rate
drops to 20, 18, and 16 percent respectively, and levels off at 15 per-
cent thereafter." Three extra years (1981-1983) at the 22-percent rate
are allowed for "secondary or tertiary production;" such production
counts, however, as part of a taxpayer's depletable quantity." Natural
gas output which qualifies for the natural gas exemption (discussed
earlier) does not count against the depletable quantity;' 9 producers
with output qualifying for both the natural gas and the independents'
exemptions must allocate taxable income between the two kinds of
production in proportion to the respective gross revenues.
The limiting depletable quantity of oil and gas under TRA is
applied to a taxpayer's total production; this is a departure from pre-
vious percentage depletion provisions, which applied to individual
producing properties. 2° Similarly, TRA replaces the former
50-percent net income limitation on percentage depletion deductions
for a single property 2 ' with a limitation of 65-percent of a taxpayer's
total taxable income." Compared to the previous provisions, the new
limitation, with its higher percentage and broader taxable-income
base, represents a less stringent constraint on percentage depletion
" INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 613A(c)(3) defines depletable oil quantity for pur-
poses of the independents' exemption by establishing a "tentative quantity" phase-out
table.
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 613A.
" M. § 6 I3A(C)(4).
1 e Id. § 6I3A(c)(3)(B).
"Id. 613A(c)(5). A convenient table combining depletable quantities and per-
centage rates under the independents' exemption, for 1975-1984+, is printed in 5 CCH
1976 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1 3564E.02, at 42,215.
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 613A(c)(6).
§ 613A(c)(1).
" Compare INT. Rev. CODE OF 1954, § 6 I 3A(c)(2), with Inrr. REV. CODE OF 1954, 613(a).
21 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6I3(a).
22 Id. 613A(d)(1). "Taxable income" is computed without regard to percentage
depletion deductions or loss carrybacks. Unused depletion allowances caused by the
taxable-income limitation may be carried forward. Id. The previous 50-percent net in-
come limitation continues to apply to gas produced under the natural gas exemption.
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deductions. This is especially true for higher-cost properties on which
it previously was difficult to generate enough net income to claim the
full depletion benefits; to the extent higher costs are concentrated
among small producers, the new taxable-income limitation in TRA
will benefit chiefly small producers.
The ceiling on percentage depletion deductions imposed by the
schedule of depletable quantities creates an obvious incentive to reor-
ganize taxpayer units." TRA contains two measures designed to pre-
vent producers from qualifying for the independents' exemption sim-
ply by reorganizing. First, the exemption is denied on any interest in
an oil or gas property transferred after December 31, 1974, if the
property has been "proven" prior to the transfer. 24 Second, only one
independents' exemption is allowed to a taxpayer, spouse and minor
children; to corporations which are part of a "controlled group;" and
to corporations, trusts, and estates owned by the same or "related
persons."25
B. Direct Revenue Effects
of the Partial Repeal of Percentage Depletion
The direct revenue effects of the percentage depletion provi-
sions in TRA consist of the increased revenues from the changes in
the tax law, less the reduction in taxes collected under other provi-
sions which interact with percentage depletion. The direct effects ig-
nore any revenue impacts of changes in market behavior induced by
TRA. A discussion of the possible market adaptations to the bill which
could cause the net revenue effects to differ from the direct effects
will be deferred until the next subsection.
To estimate the direct revenue effects of the partial repeal of
percentage depletion on domestic petroleum production," it is neces-
sary to estimate both the quantities of domestic oil and gas production
23 Consider a simple example. Suppose a taxpayer will produce exactly 2,000 bpd for
the entire period of 1975-1980 inclusive. In 1980, this taxpayer will qualify for only half the
percentage depletion deductions which can be claimed by two taxpayers each producing
1,000 bpd. At a price of $12.00 a barrel, the difference in percentage depletion allowances is
almost a million dollars a year in 1980:
total gross revenue on 1,000 bpd (366)(1,000)($12) =
	 $4,392,000
percentage depletion at 22 percent
	 X 0.22
$ 966,240
(The example assumes the taxable-income limitation is not effective.)
24 I NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6I3A(c)(9). Transfer by reason of death or pursuant to a
section 351 reorganization is excepted.
613A(c)(8). "Controlled group" is interpreted as in I NT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1563(a), with certain exceptions. "Related persons" are defined as members of a
"controlled group" or as in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 267 or 707(b).
" The revenue effects of the repeal of percentage depletion on foreign produc-
tion are discussed in section II, in conjunction with the changes made by TRA in the
taxation of petroleum foreign-source income,
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and the proportions which will qualify for the two exemptions. In ad-
dition, assumptions must be made about the market wellhead prices
of the eligible oil and gas output. Finally, the interactions of percent-
age depletion provisions with those for the minimum tax and cost
depletion must be examined. Repealing percentage depletion on a
large fraction of domestic petroleum output represents the removal of
a tax preference for many taxpayers; hence revenues from the
minimum tax on tax-preference income will decline. Also, the increase
in revenues from the partial repeal of percentage depletion will be
partially offset by increased cost depletion deductions. The offset will
be limited at first, because the cost-depletion bases of many existing
properties are very small as a result of past percentage depletion de-
ductions. As new properties are brought into production, however,
cost depletion deductions will increase. 27
The most complete estimates of the direct revenue effects of the
partial repeal by TRA of percentage depletion on domestic petroleum
production available to the authors were prepared by the United
States Treasury's Office of Tax Analysis (OTA). Table 1 presents
OTA's estimates for 1975-1979 of the revenue cost of the percentage
depletion deductions (in excess of cost depletion) that would have
been taken if the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 28 had
remained in effect. Table 2 gives OTA's estimates of the revenue gain
from the partial repeal of percentage depletion by TRA. The OTA
estimates in Tables 1 and 2 include the interactions with the
minimum-tax and cost-depletion provisions of the tax law. According
to these tables, TRA reduced percentage depletion benefits to pe-
troleum producers by about two-thirds in 1975 and will reduce them
by almost four-fifths by 1977-1979, compared to what they would
have been under the previous provisions. Thus the estimated reduc-
tions in federal tax expenditures on the oil and gas industry caused by
the partial repeal of perCentage depletion in TRA are definitely sig-
nificant in both absolute and relative terms.
"A useful illustration of the methodology for making revenue estimates is
Brannon, The Revenue Costs of Energy Tax Incentives: Underlying Assumptions, 2 TAX
NOTES, No. 5, at 5 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brannon]. That article explains the
methodology behind revenue estimates for 1971, 1972 and FY 1975, for (inter alia) total
repeal of percentage depletion and elimination of intangibles expensing, presented in 2
TAX NOTES, No. 3, at 11 (1974). Brannon discusses the assumptions about production,
prices, and interactions with the minimum tax and cost depletion; he also examines the
complex link between percentage depletion and intangibles expensing.
" Pub. L. No. 91-172 (Dec. 30, 1969).
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Table 1. Predicted Revenue Cost of Percentage Depletion
under pre-TRA Legislation
($ million),
Year	 Oil	 Gas	 Total
1975 1,961 512 2,473
1976 2,291 575 2,866
1977 2,528 644 3,172
1978 2,881 721 3,602
1979 3,020 812 3,832
Source: Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Treasury
Table 2. Predicted Revenue Gain from the Partial Repeal
of Percentage Depletion by TRA
($ million)
Year Oil Gas Total
1975 1,480 150 1,630
1976 1,737 312 2,049
1977 1,926 513 2,439
1978 2,204 575 2,779
1979 2,319 649 2,968
Source: Office of Tax Analysts, U.S. Treasury
Estimates of the proportion of total oil and gas production eligi-
ble for the independents' exemption were supplied by the Indepen-
dent Petroleum Association of America; that proportion starts at 24
percent in 1975 and declines gradually to 21 percent in 1979. The
Treasury's revenue estimates of the total direct revenue gains and
continuing revenue losses are very close to estimates made available to
the authors by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation
(JCIRT). Those estimates were based on the following assumed aver-
age domestic crude oil prices (in dollars per barrel):
1975	 1976	 1977-1980
7.79	 8.68	 9.00
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Since enactment of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act 29 in De-
cember 1975, the prices assumed by JCIRT are not implausible.
C. Other Economic Effects of the Partial
Repeal of Percentage Depletion on Oil and Gas
The economic effects of the partial repeal of percentage deple-
tion, apart from increased tax revenues, fall into three categories: ef-
fects on price, output and investment; effects on energy indepen-
dence; and effects on market structure in the petroleum industry.
The analysis of those effects is complicated by the existence of non-
tax policies, namely, price controls and allocations." Because the price
controls are currently the dominant public policies affecting 'the pe•
troleum industry, the tax changes in TRA will play a subordinate role
In addition, certain of the effects of TRA listed above may differ de-
pending on whether or not the price controls are effective; the con-
trols on oil are due to be phased out by 1980, and natural gas prices
may be deregulated at any. time. 3 ' This subsection will discuss each of
the three categories of tax effects in turn, pointing out where neces-
sary the sensitivity of the' analysis to the assumptions about price con-
trols.
1. Effects on Price, Output and Investment
A useful point of departure is to examine existing empirical'
studies of the impact of percentage depletion on crude petroleum
prices, outputs, and investment. Those studies are based on data
drawn primarily from the period prior to 1972. The impact of TRA,
however, will take place initially in an economic setting quite different
from the setting of that period. First, the real prices of oil and other
fuels have risen markedly. Second, government policies affecting
energy industries have changed considerably: the oil import quota
and state market-demand prorationing of the earlier periods are no
longer in effect, while price controls and allocations have been im-
posed on crude oil producers; the FPC continues to regulate natural
gas prices, but the "area rates" of the 1960's have been superseded by
nationwide rate-setting. The eventual phase-out of the oil price con-
" Pub. L. 94-163 (Dec. 22, 1975). This bill, which established a new basis of Oil
price controls for a 40-month period beginning January 1, 1976, is discussed further in
subsection I.C.
"The Federal Energy Administration (FEA) is charged with controlling the
prices of crude oil and refined products and, if necessary, allocating them. The Federal
Power Commission (FPC) regulates the field or wellhead prices of natural gas shipped
in interstate pipelines; state regulatory agencies are responsible for allocating gas when
shortages occur.
31 The provisions for the eventual decontrol of oil prices are contained in Title
IV of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act supra note 29. Each house of Congress
has passed a bill dealing with the deregulation of natural gas prices, but the bills differ
widely in scope and substance. See Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1976, at 3, col. 2.
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trols envisioned in recent legislation will present yet a third economic
setting. A central question in what follows is the extent to which the
research findings on the effects of percentage depletion during the
1950's and 1960's can be reversed to estimate the impact of partial
repeal in the 1970's and 1980's.
Compared to uniform tax treatment of petroleum corporation
income, the percentage depletion allowance• increases the ratio of
after-tax marginal revenue to before-tax marginal revenue for pro-
ducers of crude oil and natural gas. 32 On theoretical grounds,
percentage depletion would be expected to increase both the quantities
of crude oil and natural gas supplied by domestic producers and the
amounts of inputs they use, compared to a situation with uniform
(cost-depletion) tax treatment." One input into crude petroleum pro-
duction is proved reserves of oil and gas, which are assets acquired by
investing in the drilling of oil and gas wells; percentage depletion
would be expected to increase the amounts of proved reserves held by
producers and the rate of investment in new reserves through drill-
ing. Under the policies which prevailed during the period 1959-1971,
one would also expect that the percentage depletion allowance tended
to reduce domestic crude oil prices, because of its effect in increasing
the quantity supplied. 34
Empirical research by the present authors and others lends some
support to the above hypotheses for the period ending in the early
32 The after-tax revenue of a crude petroleum producer is an increasing function
of the rate of percentage depletion. Cox and Wright, The Determinants af Investment in
Petroleum Reserves and Their Implications for Public Policy, 66 AMERICAN ECON. REV.
equation (2) at 154 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Petroleum Reserves]. Since percentage de-
pletion could only be elected at the expense of cost depletion, the gain in after-tax revenue is
offset by an increase in the after-tax cost of a unit of proved reserves. Id., equation (3) at 155.
In a preponderance of cases, however, the offset must have been only partial, since produc-
ers elected the percentage depletion option—presumably because it was more profitable,
after tax—in all but a few cases. S. MCDONALD, FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF INCOME FROM
OIL AND GAS 17 n. 16 (1963). Brannon, supra note 27, at 7, suggests that the net value of
percentage depletion to a petroleum producer—that is, the gross value of percentage
depletion deductions minus the value of cost depletion deductions—was about 15 percent of
tax liability before oil prices rose sharply in 1973-1974, and about 17 percent in 1974.
" Unless otherwise noted, the hypothesized effects of public policies assume that
all other pertinent factors are held constant; economists refer to such effects as "partial"
or "ceteris paribus."
34 From 1959 to 1971, the domestic price of crude oil was protected from world
market forces by the oil import quota. A major determinant of domestic crude oil sup-
ply was "market-demand prorationing," a form of production restriction practiced by
Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, New Mexico and Kansas in order to support crude oil
prices. Increasingly during the period, FPC regulation of natural gas field or wellhead
prices created an excess demand, or shortage, in the market for natural gas. Given
these three policies, any increase in the quantity supplied of crude oil would tend to re-
duce the domestic market price of oil. The other policies could, of course, have been
altered to offset an oil price reduction due to percentage depletion.
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1970's.35 The empirical evidence is most clear-cut for the impact on
reserves; the author's own estimates indicate that percentage deple-
tion, along with the expensing of intangible drilling costs, had a statis-
tically significant positive effect on the stock of proved reserves held
by crude petroleum producers, and on their rate of net investment in
proved reserves." Preliminary estimates of the effect on the quantity
of crude oil supplied, however, do not provide support for a signifi-
cant effect of tax variables. The finding that percentage depletion had
a statistically significant positive effect on proved reserves does not, of
course, in itself constitute a finding that it was a desirable public pol-
icy. Consider, for example, the policy objective of energy indepen-
dence. For that objective, the increase in proved reserves would be a
benefit of percentage depletion. To evaluate the effectiveness of per-
centage depletion as public policy, however, would require that its so-
cial costs be compared to the costs of alternative policies for promot-
ing energy independence. Our research suggests that percentage de-
pletion was not a cost-effective policy in that sense.3'
What do the above empirical findings imply about the economic
impact of TRA on petroleum price, output and investment? In par-
ticular, to what extent would that impact be the reverse of the effects
found for percentage depletion for the period prior to 1972? The
answers to these questions turn on the significance of three factors:
(1) the fact that the repeal of percentage depletion by TRA was par-
tial, not total; (2) the change in the public policy environment from
the import quota and state market-demand prorationing of the earlier
period, to the free foreign trade and domestic crude-oil price controls
of the present; and (3) the hazards of extrapolating empirical esti-
mates beyond the range of observation of the variables which underlie
them.
As shown above, TRA created the incentive for producers to or-
ganize the ownership of new petroleum-producing properties so as to
qualify for the independents' exemption. To the extent producers ac-
tually respond to that incentive, the size composition of firms in the
producing segment of the petroleum industry will be different in the
33 Cox and Wright, The Cost-Effectiveness of Federal Tax Subsidies for Petroleum Re-
serves, in STUDIES IN ENERGY TAX POLICY 177 (G. Brannon ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Cost-Effectiveness]; Petroleum Reserves, supra note 32; Cox and Wright, Research Tasks on
the Economics of Tax and Other Policies towards Petroleum, forthcoming in Conference on Tax
Research, 1975, United States Treasury (1976). See also Erickson, Millsaps, & Spann, Oil
Supply and Tax Incentives, 2 Bitoottirvcs PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 449 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Oil Supply]; MacAvoy Pindyck, Alternative Regulatory Policies for
Dealing with the Natural Gas Shortage, 4 BELI. J. OF ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 454
(1973); Pindyck, The Regulatory Implications of Three Alternative Econometric Supply Models
of Natural Gas, 5 BELL J. OF ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 633 (1974).
" Our estimates also indicate that the import quota had a statistically significant
positive impact on reserves.
"Cost-Effectiveness, supra note 35; Cox & Wright, The Economics of the Oil Industry's
Tax Burden, in TAXATION WITH REPRESENTATION. THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY'S TAX
BURDEN 5(1973).
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1970's and 1980's from what it was in earlier decades. If that is the
case, estimates of price and other elasticities based on aggregated data
from past periods may not be good estimates of the actual elasticities
which firms in the aggregate will exhibit in the future.
Under the policies of state market-demand prorationing and the
oil import quota, the decade and a half prior to 1973 was charac-
terized by remarkable price stability in the domestic petroleum indus-
try, especially the crude oil segment of it. In such an environment,
there was little uncertainty about prospective future petroleum prices,
and econometric estimates based on data from that period should re-
flect stable expectations about prices. In marked contrast to the
period 1959-1972 is the present environment, which is characterized
by considerable uncertainty about future petroleum prices. The pri-
mary sources of the uncertainty are the possible instability of the car-
tel that is currently setting world crude oil prices, and the inherently
political nature of U.S. price controls and import policy regarding
petroleum. Adaptation by producers to the present uncertainty about
prices could cause current price-elasticities to differ significantly from
those of the past, estimated with data drawn from periods with rela-
tively stable price expectations.
Finally, the normally hazardous procedure of extrapolating em-
pirical results ahead in time has been rendered impracticable by the
very large increases since 1973 in crude oil prices. As a result of those
increases, current oil prices are far outside the range of values which
prevailed during the period from which the findings were obtained.
The import of the above three factors is that, while certain qual-
itative statements are supported by the empirical results for earlier
periods, it would be misleading to attempt to determine quantitative
magnitudes for the effects of the partial repeal of percentage deple-
tion by TRA on the basis of those earlier results. Therefore, the fol-
lowing remarks are restricted to the probable qualitative effects of
TRA.
It is convenient to begin with the policy environment which will
come into effect once the crude oil price controls have been phased
out (as envisioned under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act); it
is also assumed that natural gas has been deregulated and there are
no restrictions on oil imports. Given the market prices of oil and gas,
TRA will reduce the after-tax marginal revenue of all domestic pe-
troleum output except that which qualifies for the natural gas exemp-
tion and (until 1980, when the percentage depletion rate begins to
fall) for the independents' exemption. 38 The switch from percentage
to cost depletion will provide some offset, especially on new wells,
whose cost-depletable bases will not have been reduced by past per-
a The argument is the reverse of that in supra note 32. In 1980, when the
crude-oil price controls are scheduled to expire, the maximum "depletable quantity"
under the independents' exemption will have reached its floor of 1,000 bpd; thereafter,
the permissible percentage depletion rate will decline towards its floor of 15 percent.
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centage depletion deductions. If past experience is any guide, how-
ever, cost depletion will be less profitable, after tax, than percentage
depletion would have been, even on new wells." Hence TRA should
cause declines in both oil and gas output and investment in proved
petroleum reserves, compared to the situation without it. It is worth
repeating that finding this probable qualitative effect of TRA on
domestic petroleum output and reserves does not answer the question
of whether TRA—or percentage depletion under the previous tax
provisions—represents optimal public policy.
In the same policy environment of no price controls or import
restrictions, the partial repeal of percentage depletion will have no ef-
fect on crude-oil or refined-product prices, even though, as indicated
above, domestic oil output would decline. This result would occur be-
cause the United States is a price-taker in the world crude oil market,
now dominated by the cartel of the major exporting countries. With
no price controls or import restrictions, the price of domestic oil out-
put will be determined by the delivered price of imported crude oil,
so long as the United States is a net importer of oil. Thus domestic
crude oil producers will not be able, by raising prices, to shift forward
to consumers the increased tax payments due to the partial repeal of
percentage depletion. If natural gas prices are deregulated, however,
gas producers could shift part of the increased taxes forward through
higher prices.""
The current policy environment consists of price controls and al-
locations of both oil and natural gas, with uncertainty about when or
whether the government regulations will end. The uncertainty may
lead producers to speculate about the end of the controls by curtailing
current output and investment in anticipation of higher prices and
greater freedom to maneuver in future periods. Holding constant any
speculative response to the uncertainty about market price, the partial
repeal of percentage depletion by TRA will further reduce output
and investment, compared to the situation without TRA."' The reason
for this reduction is the same as that operating in the eventual future
policy environment of no controls or regulation: given the market
price of oil or gas, the percentage depletion provisions in TRA would
39 Cf. note 32 supra.
" The reasoning is as follows. The demand for natural gas, which is a substitute for
crude oil will not be affected by TRA in this policy environment, since crude oil prices will
not change. As argued above, however, less gas will be supplied at any market price with
TRA than without it. This will cause the (deregulated) price of gas to rise; the increase will be
some fraction of the increase in supply-price caused byrTRA, depending on the relative
price-elasticities of demand and supply. The switch to cost depletion will partially, but not
completely, offset the supply shift and hence the price increase. This argument assumes that
the United States is not a price-taker in the market for imported natural gas.
" Because 6 mcf of gas are worth substantially less at present regulated prices
than is a barrel of crude oil, the 6 mcf: I barrel conversion factor in TRA will cause
producers to maximize the crude oil component in their "depletable quantities." This
will tend to aggravate the shortage of natural gas at FPC-regulated prices.
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reduce the after-tax marginal revenue received by producers, with
only a partial offset from the use of cost depletion. Unlike the case of
no price controls, however, the partial repeal of percentage depletion
by TRA will increase the prices of refined oil products. In addition, it
may raise natural gas prices in the intrastate market (which is outside
the jurisdiction of the FPC). Each case will be examined in turn.
Under the existing programs of oil price controls and crude-oil
"entitlements," the reduction in domestic crude oil production in-
duced by TRA will cause increases in both the marginal and the average
costs of crude oil to refiners. The higher average cost of crude oil will
in turn lead the FEA to raise the maximum permissible controlled
prices of refined products. To explain these assertions, the interaction
of the price controls and entitlements must be examined.
The crude oil price controls effect an income transfer from
crude oil producers to refiners and consumers of refined oil products.
The amount of the transfer equals the quantity of price-controlled
production times the difference between the uncontrolled (free-
market) price and controlled price. The FEA's entitlements program
distributes the transfer among refiners, and a portion of it is passed
through to consumers in the form of lower retail prices of refined
products. An individual refiner's share of the income transfer is calcu-
lated as the ratio of his own crude-oil throughput ("crude run to stills")
to the total throughput of domestic U.S. refineries. Any individual re-
finer can increase his share of the available entitlements by expanding
his throughput of crude oil. He will, of course, have to pay the free-
market price for the additional oil; however, the effective marginal
cost of an extra barrel of crude oil to the refiner is less than the
free-market price because of the entitlements program. 42 Specifically,
that marginal cost is the uncontrolled (free-market) price less the value
of the extra share of the income transfer the refiner receives through
the entitlements program by expanding his crude oil throughput. 43
42 We are indebted to David Mead of the FEA for first pointing this out to us. If
the entitlements program did not exist, the marginal cost of crude oil to a refiner
would be the uncontrolled or free-market price. In that case, any reduction in output
of price-controlled oil because of TRA would affect the average cost but not the marginal
cost of crude oil to refiners.
" To see this, define the following terms; p in is the unregulated market price of
crude oil; pc is the controlled pita: of crude oil; X is the total production of price-
controlled oil; qi is the quantity of crude oil throughput by the jth refinery; Q is the
quantity of cm& oil throughput by all refineries. Then the total cost crcp, average
cost (ACJ), and marginal cost (MCP) of crude oil to the jth refinery arc as follOws:j
TC• = p g. - [(p - p 1X14 /C21m 	 .m. c
AC. = pM [(Pin- [(p- - pc )X111/Q.1
MC. =' pm [(pm - pc 1)XJ[d(g./Q)/dgq.1
So long as p c ;<pm., then MCJ<pm . (Note that both marginal and average crude oil
costs are increasing functions of the controlled price, p c. Thus one implication of the
above discussion of entitlements is that, contrary to statements by some economists,
crude oil price deregulation will raise refined product prices. This is the issue analyzed
by Mead, supra note 42.)
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As suggested earlier, the partial repeal of percentage depletion
by TRA should cause the production of price-controlled domestic
crude oil to decrease. Any reduction in price-controlled production
will reduce the size of the income transfer received by refiners
through the entitlements program and hence increase both their mar-
ginal and average costs of crude oil." Under the price-control provi-
sions of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act,"s the increased aver-
age costs of crude oil to refiners will lead the FEA to raise the max-
imum permissible controlled prices of refined products. The combina-
tion of higher marginal and average costs of crude oil to refiners and
higher ceiling prices on refined products means that TRA will cause
an increase in the price of every refined product for which the United
States is not a price-taker in the import market. This conclusion holds,
no matter what market structure one assumes prevails in the domestic
U.S. oil industry.
The effects of the partial repeal of percentage depletion by TRA
on natural gas prices under the present policies are more straightfor-
ward than those for crude oil and refined products. TRA will have no
direct effect on the price of interstate gas, which is regulated by the
FPC; holding the regulated price constant, reductions in natural gas
committed to the interstate market will exacerbate the existing short-
age there. TRA should, however, raise prices in intrastate gas mar-
kets, where prices are subject to market forces. This is because the re-
duction of depletion benefits will cause investment in new gas reserves
for that market to fall; and with time, the lower investment would re-
sult in lower production than if TRA had not been passed.
The petroleum market effects of the partial repeal of percentage
depletion analyzed above will tend to reduce the direct revenue ef-
fects discussed in section I.B. This is because the output and price
adaptations to TRA will necessarily reduce the taxable income of crude
petroleum producers." Hence, to the extent those producers respond
to TRA as has been suggested, the net revenue effects of Title V of
the bill will be smaller than the direct revenue effects. The amount of
the difference between direct and net revenue effects cannot, unfor-
tunately, be ascertained with any degree of precision.
A final point to be noted here concerns the impact of TRA,
through its effects on petroleum prices (or, in the interstate gas mar-
ket, excess demand), on market variables in the coal industry. Since
refined oil products and natural gas are substitutes for coal, increases
in their prices (or in excess demands for them) will cause the demand
for coal to increase: more coal will be demanded at every price. Given
the domestic supply of coal—TRA did not alter percentage depletion
"4 In terms of the equations in note 43 supra, both Acj and MCj are decreasing in
X, the total production of price-controlled oil.
45 Pub. L. No. 94-163 (Dec. 22, 1976).
46 The market adjustments to TRA will reduce taxable income so long as marginal
returns in oil and gas production are positive.
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deductions (at 10 percent) for coal producers47—an increase in de-
mand will raise the price of coal; the higher price in turn will create
an incentive for greater coal production and investment. Under the
existing price-control policies in petroleum markets, then, the higher
prices of refined products and intrastate gas, and the larger excess
demand for interstate gas, induced by TRA, will raise coal price, out-
put and investment. When and if the price controls are removed,
TRA will have no differential impact on coal through refined-product
prices, which will not be affected; the higher prices of natural gas,
however, will cause higher coal prices, hence also output and invest-
ment, than if TRA had not been passed.
2. Effects on Energy Independence
Ever since the Arab embargo of 1973-1974, independence in oil
and other forms of energy has been a central focus of public policy
discussions. At first, the Nixon administration adopted complete self-
sufficiency (i.e., zero imports) by 1980 as its goal for energy
independence." Currently, the Ford administration's goal is to reduce
oil imports below 5 million bpd (1.825 billion barrels a year) by
1985.4" Certain policies have focused specifically on increasing energy
independence—for example, the creation of a "strategic reserve" of
crude oil and refined products, as insurance against the disruptions of
another embargo.5° However, policies which focus on other issues,
such as the taxation of petroleum income, may also have effects on
independence.5' This subsection will assess the impact of the partial
repeal of percentage depletion by TRA on national independence in
energy.
In essence, to be more "independent" in oil (or any other good
that is imported) is to be less vulnerable to a sudden disruption of
import supplies. To economists, vulnerability is best measured in
terms of the costs which a cut-off of imports would impose on house-
holds, firms, and government agencies, including the military; the less
vulnerable a country is with respect to energy imports, the lower the
costs to that country of an embargo like the one on oil. To determine
47 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1 954. 613.
48 M.I.T. ENERGY LABORATORY POLICY STUDY GROUP. ENERGY SELE- SUFFICIENCY: AN
ECONOMIC EVALUATION I (1974).
" N.Y. Times, Feb. II, 1976, at 61, col. 6.
" Title I, Part B, of the Energy l'olicy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163 (Dec.
22, 1975) provides for the strategic reserve of oil.
The objective of energy independence, in an earlier guise referred to as "na-
tional security," frequently figured in the political debate over the special tax provisions
for petroleum which TRA eventually altered. Petroleum lobby groups and other indus-
try representatives often asserted that any reduction in percentage depletion benefits
would "weaken" the domestic U.S. petroleum industry and thereby cause a deteriora-
tion in "national security" or energy independence. See, e.g., jouvr Comminti ON THE
ECONOMIC REPORT, FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR GROWTH AND STABILITY. 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. 419-93 (1955); AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, PETROLEUM TAXATION AND ENERGY
INDEPENDENCE (1974).
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the economically optimal degree of independence, of course, the costs
of securing the means of protecting against a sudden disruption must
be set against the expected costs of the disruption itself. Measured as
above, vulnerability in oil can be reduced by holding domestic excess
capacity in reserve, so that it is available to replace oil imports if they
are cut off on short notice. Vulnerability can also be reduced by in-
creasing the degree of self-sufficiency—that is, by cutting oil imports
and raising domestic production. 52
The impact of TRA on energy independence depends on its ef-
fects on the quantities of crude oil and refined product imports and
on domestic production of crude oil, natural gas, and coal. 53 As dem-
onstrated above, the partial repeal of percentage depletion by TRA
creates incentives to reduce domestic production and investment in
petroleum, and to increase them in coal, whether or not there are
petroleum price controls. The effects of TRA on petroleum prices (or
excess demands) and on imports, however, differ between the present
price-controlled policy environment and the prospective future free-
market environment. Each case is discussed in turn.
Under existing policies, any reduction in price-controlled domes-
tic crude oil production induced by TRA will lead to an increase in
refined-product prices, because of the way the entitlements program
works. TRA will not directly affect interstate natural gas prices—
which are controlled by the FPC—but if it reduces output for that
market, it will widen the existing shortage at the regulated price. In
intrastate gas markets, any output reductions caused by TRA will raise
prices. The higher prices of refined oil products will increase the de-
mands for natural gas and coal; the combination of the worsened
shortage in the interstate gas market and the higher intrastate gas
prices will shift demand to coal and refined products.
The foregoing effects of TRA in the current policy environment
imply that the bill will have a qualitatively indeterminate impact on
energy independence. To the extent producers respond to the incen-
tive in TRA to reduce domestic crude oil production, oil imports will
increase—in absolute amount and in proportion to total quantity
demanded—to replace the domestic production. The increase in de-
mand for refined oil products originating in the interstate and intra-
state gas markets will also work to increase oil imports. The increase
52 For a detailed discussion of the concept of energy independence, see Cox and
Wright, A Tariff Policy for Independence from Oil Embargoes, 28 NAn TAX J. 29 (1975).
Note that for a depletable natural resource like petroleum, reducing current
vulnerability by increasing domestic production will make it more expensive to reduce
future vulnerability. This is because the increase in current production accelerates the
rate of resource depletion, thereby raising the cost of developing domestic petroleum
resources in future periods. In the subsequent discussion, we shall ignore the complica-
tions introduced by this trade-off between present and future energy independence.
" In  the present discussion it is assumed that the United States will not be a
price-taker in import markets for natural gas, liquefied natural gas, or coal.
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in the prices of refined products, however, will reduce the quantities
of both products and crude oil demanded, hence also the volume of
oil imports. Coal output and investment will expand in response to
the increased demand for coal coming from both the oil and the gas
markets. Overall, then, under the present policies of price controls
and free foreign trade in oil, the effect of TRA on energy indepen-
dence is ambiguous, since it consists of reductions in domestic oil and
gas production, an increase in coal production, and an indeterminate
effect on oil imports.
In the prospective future policy environment, TRA will have an
unambiguously adverse impact on energy independence. With no
price controls or import restrictions, the existence of TRA will not
cause any differential in refined oil product prices: the cost of domes-
tic crude oil to refiners—determined by the delivered price of
imported oil—will not be affected by TRA, even though domestic
crude oil production will be smaller with the bill than without it. With
natural gas prices no longer regulated, TRA will be responsible for
higher natural gas prices than would prevail without it; the higher gas
prices will in turn raise the demands' for both refined products and
coal. The overall effects of smaller domestic oil and gas production
and a higher gas price will be the substitution of imported oil and
domestic coal for domestic oil and gas; As a result, oil imports will in-
crease both absolutely and as a proportion of total U.S. energy con-
sumption.
3. Effects on Industry Market Structure
The degree of monopoly power in the petroleum industry is a
public policy issue with roots going back to the 19th century. The
"energy crisis" has rekindled interest in this issue: critics of the indus-
try heatedly accuse it of monopolistic practices, and the industry just
as heatedly denies the charges. Presidential candidates and other
politicians have offered a variety of Proposals to reduce the alleged
monopoly power of the largest oil and gas companies, and a bill has
been introduced in the Senate which would break up those firms.
It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt to evaluate the
recent allegations of monopolistic practices by the petroleum
industry." However, it is possible to point out the effects which the
partial repeal of percentage depletion by TRA is likely to have on two
magnitudes which frequently figure in the policy dispute over
monopoly power in petroleum. Those magnitudes are the degree of
"concentration" in markets for crude oil and natural gas, and the de-
" The interested reader may consult the following: Davidson, Falk and Lee, Oil:
Its Time Allocation and Project Independence, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 411
(1974); Oil Supply, supra note 20; Mulholland and Webbink, Concentration Levels and
Trends in the Energy Sector of the U.S. Economy, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ECONOMIC
REPORT (March 1974).
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gree of "vertical integration" in the oil industry." Market concentra-
tion has to do with the proportion of total industry sales—or assets,
employment, value-added, and so on—accounted for by different
numbers of firms in the industry, ranked according to size. The more
firms included, in a given percentage of total sales, the less concen-
trated is the industry and therefore, in the conventional view, the
smaller the possibility of monopoly power. Vertical integration refers
to the number of stages of the production process, from natural re-
sources to finished consumer goods, encompassed within an indi-
vidual company; integrated firms are sometimes said to gain
monopoly power in one stage of production because of their control
over other stages of production.
As demonstrated above, TRA contains an incentive to organize
new extraction facilities for crude oil and natural gas in units small
enough to qualify for the independents' exemption. In addition, the
exclusion of petroleum retailers from that exemption gives an incen-
tive to have non-integrated rather than integrated companies "prove
up" new reserves. To the extent decision makers in the petroleum in-
dustry find it profitable (after tax) to respond to those incentives,
TRA will reduce both market concentration—the share of large
producers—in crude oil and natural gas production and the degree of
integration by oil refiners "backwards" into crude oil production. The
exact extent of the reductions in concentration and vertical integra-
tion cannot, of course, be determined without a detailed study of the
existing market structures in the industry and of the effects of other
policies than TRA. Such a study would be outside the scope of this ar-
ticle. The same reason precludes judgment of whether TRA repres-
ents the most effective public policy in terms of its effects on market
structure.
II. CHANGES IN THE TAXATION OF FOREIGN PETROLEUM INCOME
Subsection II.A. will summarize the changes introduced by TRA
in the taxation of U.S. corporations' foreign petroleum income. The
remainder of the section will discuss how effectively TRA deals with
three current issues of foreign tax policy. Estimates of the revenue
and other economic effects of the foreign tax changes in TRA are
covered in the discussion of the three policy issues.
A. Specific Provisions of TRA
As indicated above in subsection I.A., Title V of TRA repeals
the percentage depletion allowance on all foreign oil and gas produc-
tion. Title VI of the bill introduces special rules governing the taxa-
55 The issue of possible monopoly power in energy markets generally, due to diver-
sification by oil companies into coal and other fuel industries, is not dealt with here.
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tion of foreign income from oil and gas operations. 56 These rules im-
pose new limits on the amounts of foreign tax credits petroleum com-
panies may claim;" deny the companies the use of the per-country
method of calculating foreign tax credits;" and provide for revenue
recapture of deductions for losses on petroleum activities abroad." In
addition, Title VI restricts the scope of payments to foreign govern-
ments which will be considered income taxes for purposes of deter-
mining allowable foreign tax credits. 6°
The basic feature of the special rules is that, for tax years ending
after December 31, 1974, so-called "foreign oil related income" will be
treated separately from other taxable foreign income in applying the
section 904 limitations on foreign tax credits. Foreign oil related in-
come includes taxable income from the foreign extraction, processing,
and distribution of oil and gas; from the sale or exchange of assets
used in any of those activities; and from dividends, interest, and part-
nership shares on foreign petroleum operations." The separation of
oil related income from other foreign income with reference to the
section 904 limitations means that excess foreign tax credits from pe-
troleum operations may only be used to offset U.S. tax liabilities on
foreign oil related income.
Related to the concept of foreign oil related income is the
"foreign oil related loss." This loss occurs if the sum of the taxpayer's
normal foreign deductions" is greater than his foreign oil related
income." For tax years ending after December 31, 1975, any reduc-
tion in U.S. tax liability caused by using a foreign oil related loss to
offset domestic income will be recaptured in subsequent years in
which the taxpayer has foreign oil related income. The recapture is to
be accomplished by treating as income from domestic sources 50 per-
cent of each subsequent year's foreign oil related income until the re-
venue loss is fully made good. In addition, total creditable foreign
taxes are to be reduced by that proportion of total foreign oil related
income which is treated as domestic U.S. income for purposes of the
loss recapture."
On income from foreign oil and gas extraction, Title VI of TRA
limits the foreign taxes which qualify for the credit to specified per-
centages of U.S.-taxable income from such extraction. At the existing
56 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 907, added by Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 691 (March 29,
1975).
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 907(a).
" Id. § 907(b).
"id. § 9070).
"Id. 901(f). (Note: this subsection replaces the previous subsection (f), which
becomes subsection (g).)
" Id. § 907(c).
" Certain special deductions may not be used in computing this loss. For a concise
listing of them, see 6 CCH 1976 STAND. FED. TAX REP. y 43321 10 at 50,162.
66 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 907(f)(6).
"Id. § 907(f).
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corporation income tax rate of 48 percent, the specified percentages
are 52.8 for 1975, 50.4 for 1976, and 50 thereafter." Taxes paid in
excess of those percentages may not be used, even as deductions, to
reduce U.S. income tax liability. Two additional provisions of TRA re-
strict the prices which may be used and the definition of eligible taxes
paid in computing foreign tax credits. One subsection prohibits the
use of "posted" or other fictitious prices to determine taxable income
from extraction if oil or gas is sold, or if it is purchased from anybody
but a foreign government." Another subsection provides that pay-
ments to foreign governments in transactions for oil and gas will not
be regarded as taxes if the taxpayer has no "economic interest" in the
petroleum in question, and if the price used in the transaction is not
the "fair market value.""
B. The Foreign Tax Policy Effectiveness of TRA
The implications of the changes introduced by TRA in the taxa-
tion of foreign petroleum income can usefully be discussed in the con-
text of three controversial policy issues." First, are American oil com-
panies given a tax incentive to invest in foreign oil development at a
time when domestic development is supposedly an objective of public
policy? Second, are the "income taxes" paid to producer country gov-
ernments by the oil companies in reality excise taxes assessed in lieu
of higher royalties? Third, do the vertically integrated international
oil companies use fictitious internal pricing to transfer profits from
countries with high marginal (U.S. plus foreign) tax rates to countries
with low marginal rates? This subsection will examine each of these is-
sues, and will discuss how effectively TRA deals with them.
65 Id. § 907(a). The stated rationale for the "leeway" of several percentage points
above the U.S. statutory corporation income tax rate was that, with it, "oil companies
generally would not be treated less favorably than other American companies operating
abroad" H.R. REP, No. 93-1028, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT]. This source was the Ways and Means Committee report to the full
house on H.R. 14462, The Oil and Gas Energy Revenue Act of 1974, which contained
the original versions of the petroleum provisions in TRA.
Particular provisions covering the "Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation [which]
is a member of an affiliated group are given in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 907(g).
°° INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 907(d).
901(0.
6° In writing this subsection, the authors have benefitted from the following: M.
ADELMAN, THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET (1972) [hereinafter cited as WORLD
PETROLEUM MARKET]; Jenkins & B. Wright, Taxation of Income of Milani:Ilona! Corpora-
tions: The Case of the U.S. Petroleum Industry, 57 REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS I (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Taxation of Income]; and B. Wright, Taxation of the Overseas Oper-
ations of the U.S. Petroleum Industry, in The Taxation of Petroleum Production, 1976
(unpublished PhD. dissertation, Dep't of Econ., Harvard Univ.) [hereinafter cited as Over-
seas Operations].
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I. Tax Incentive for Foreign Oil Development
The time stream of income from a new petroleum province is
typically negative for the first few years, when exploration costs are
incurred but there is little or no extraction. As extraction increases,
the income stream becomes positive. The time pattern of initial losses
and later positive income is exaggerated in terms of after-tax income
by federal tax provisions that permit so-called "intangible" drilling
costs and "dry-hole" costs to be expensed as incurred, rather than
capitalized and depreciated over several years, as uniform tax treat-
ment would require. Before TRA was passed, an international oil
company could deduct the foreign drilling costs (as losses) from its
domestic U.S. income if it used the per-country limitation, or if it
used the overall limitation but did not have much foreign income
from other sources. When the new petroleum province later pro-
duced income, the company could typically shield that income com-
pletely from U.S. tax with foreign tax credits. Thus, the U.S. Trea-
sury bore part of the costs of foreign oil development but did not
share in the income from it. In effect, the United States provided a
tax incentive for the development of foreign oil fields.
The denial of the per-country limitation to oil companies and
the provision for the recapture of foreign oil related losses in TRA
will remove a large share of the subsidies just described and hence
reduce the tax incentive to develop foreign oil resources. Restricted to
the overall limitation, established oil companies with large amounts of
foreign production will be prevented from deducting drilling costs in
new foreign petroleum provinces from their U.S. domestic income.
New American entrants into foreign oil development will still be able
to deduct those costs from domestic U.S. income under the overall
limitation. Under the loss recapture provision, however, a company
that reduces its tax payment in one year by deducting foreign oil re-
lated losses from domestic income will only defer the tax until later
years if it eventually earns sufficient foreign income. Thus, TRA con-
tinues the tax incentive to foreign oil investment only to the extent
that the present discounted value of deferred tax payments is less
than the present value of current tax payments, and in the event that
an international oil company has no foreign oil related income in sub-
sequent years.
2. Income Taxes or Royalties?
Many foreign governments collect relatively small "royalty" pay-
ments from oil companies extracting oil in their countries; however,
they impose heavy "income taxes" on the companies. In virtually all
cases, the governments of the foreign oil producing countries own the
mineral rights to the oil in addition to being the taxing authority.
Thus, for purposes of collecting the economic rents on their lower-
cost oil resources, it makes no difference to the governments whether
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the payments they receive are labelled royalties, excise taxes, or in-
come taxes. From the standpoint of the U.S. international oil com-
panies, however, the label assigned to the payments is very important.
Any payment which is called a royalty or an excise tax can be de-
ducted from gross income in calculating U.S. corporation income tax
liability on foreign source income. In contrast, any payment which is
labelled an income tax can be credited against the tax liability itself.
Therefore any income tax payments to foreign governments up to the
amount of tax they would owe the U.S. Treasury on their foreign-
source incomes does not cost the oil companies anything.
The "income tax" payments collected by the governments of the
major oil exporting countries are calculated as a percentage rate times
a "net income" figure, determined as the quantity of production times
the difference between a non-market, negotiated "posted price" and a
unit cost of production. It has been alleged that these payments are
not in fact income taxes; this is because the "net income" base on
which the tax is assessed is not the actual net income from oil produc-
tion, since "posted prices" do not represent the market value of crude
oiI. 69 The oil companies' payments to the producer country govern-
ments more nearly represent excise taxes or royalties, because the
amount of the payments depends on the quantity of production but
not on the market price.
There is widespread agreement among economists and other tax
professionals that the above allegation is correct. 7° Nevertheless, the
larger part of the tax payments made to the producer-country gov-
ernments by the oil companies have been accepted by the U.S. Trea-
sury as income tax payments, and have therefore been credited
against the companies' U.S. corporation income tax liabilities on
foreign-source income. This arrangement for paying royalties to the
producer countries began in 1950, in response to Saudi Arabian de-
mands for a larger share of oil revenues. The State Department and
the National Security Council prevailed on the U.S. Treasury to ac-
cept increased payments by the oil companies as creditable income
taxes, thus transferring tax revenues from the U.S. government to the
Saudi government without (at that time) increasing the costs of the
companies." Since the early 1950's, the arrangement has meant that
the oil companies have amassed large amounts of excess foreign tax
credits — creditable "income taxes" in excess of the putative U.S. tax
liabilities on their foreign source incomes. With the sharp increases in
" This point is developed more fully in WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET.Hipta note 68, at
207-10.
"Id.; Taxation of Income, supra note 68, at 10; Overseas Operations, supra note 68;
TAM Calls for Revocations of Oil Credit Rulings, S TAX NOTES. No. 2, at 4 (1975).
" Overseas Operations, supra note 68, at 9 n.I5, citing 1974 testimony by Ambas.
sador George McGee before the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations.
See also G. BRANNON, ENERGY TAXES AND SUBSIDIES: A REPORT TO THE ENERGY Policy
PRojEcr OF THE FORD FOUNDATION 104 n.8 (1974).
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"posted prices" since 1972, those excess credits have risen astronomi-
cally.
The report of the Committee on Ways and Means to the full
House on H.R. 14462, the 1974 bill which prefigured TRA, contained
the following statement: The committee concluded that this advan-
tage of, in effect, converting royalty payments into taxes creditable
against U.S. taxes should be stopped. 72 Thus one of the two major
tax-writing committees in the Congress explicitly recognized the valid-
ity of the allegation that the oil companies' "income tax" payments to
the oil-exporting countries are really royalties for extraction rights. In
spite of the recognition that the advantage should be stopped, how-'
ever, the foreign tax provisions carried over from H.R. 14462 into
TRA do not in fact stop the conversion of extraction royalties into
creditable income taxes. Instead, they merely limit that conversion
and reduce the scope for using excess tax credits from extraction to
offset liabilities in other lines of economic activity, both oil related and
non-oil.
The percentage limitations in TRA on creditable foreign taxes
on extraction income will obviously not impose any U.S. taxes on that
income, because the percentage limits-52.8 in 1975, 50.4 in 1976,
and 50 thereafter?—all exceed the U.S. statutory corporation income
tax rate of 48 percent. In addition, the repeal of percentage depletion
on foreign wells will not by itself impose any taxes on foreign extrac-
tion income, because the oil companies will still have two percentage
points of excess foreign tax credits even under the 50 percent limita-
tion. That limitation could impose U.S. taxes on foreign oil related in-
come from non-extraction activities, if a company's excess tax credits
on extraction income were not sufficient to shield from U.S. tax their
other oil related income in countries whose income tax rates are below
the U.S. rate. The provision in TRA which separates oil from non-oil
related foreign income in determining and applying foreign tax cred-
its will increase the U.S. tax liabilities of those oil companies which
have diversified into unrelated foreign industries and have previously
used excess credits from oil operations to offset non-oil tax liabilities.
The proportion of oil company foreign-source income which comes
from non-oil related sources is, however, quite small; therefore the
revenue impact of this provision should be relatively minor.
The only sizeable impact of the percentage income limitations on
foreign tax credits from extraction will be on the amount of excess
credits themselves. Using U. S. Treasury data, it is possible to estimate
the amount of the petroleum industry's actual 1974 excess foreign tax
credits which would have been disallowed if the rules introduced by
TRA for each of 1975, 1976, and 1977 et seq. had been in force dur-
72 House REPORT, supra note 65, at 9.
73 INT. REV. Cone OF 1954, 907(a).
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ing 1974." "Foreign source income taxable under U.S. law" in 1974
was $27,400 million; the "tentative U.S. tax" was therefore $13,152
million. Calculating the various maximum foreign tax credits allowed
with and without the TRA changes, and then subtracting the tentative
U.S. tax from those credits, gives estimates of the excess foreign tax
credits under the particular rules in question. The resulting figures
may be summarized as follows:
Table 3. Effects of Applying TRA Rules
to 1974 Oil Industry Foreign Tax Credits
($ million)
Maximum Foreign	 Estimated
Tax Credits	 Excess Foreign
Allowed
	
Tax Credits c
1974 actual a 23,500.0 10,348.0
1975 TRA rules" 14,467.2 1,315.2
1976 TRA rules b 13,809.6 657.6
1977 TRA rulesb 13,700.0 548.0
a Foreign taxes paid.
b U.S.-taxable income times the limiting percentage in TRA
($27,400 times .528, .504, and .50 respectively).
c Maximum credits allowed minus tentative U.S. tax of
$13,152 million.
It should be stressed that the putative figures in Table 3 for
1974 excess foreign tax credits according to the TRA rules are only
rough estimates. In particular, the percentage limits on creditable
foreign taxes paid on extraction income are applied to all foreign-
source oil income; the proportions of extraction and non-extraction
income and the effective tax rates on each are not known. These es-
timates could, however, have a large percentage bias and the conclu-
sion would still be the same. The TRA percentage income limitations
will have a very large impact on the excess foreign tax credits of the oil
industry. The percentage income limits will therefore remove most of
the large overhang of excess foreign tax credits which has built up in
recent years with the sharp increases in oil prices and exporting.
country taxes. Given the five-year carry-forward provisions which
apply to excess credits, removing the overhang can be viewed as a
7. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME:
STATISTICAL DATA, 94th Cong., lit Sess. 13,20 (1975).
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necessary first step towards any future significant U.S. taxation of the
foreign source income of oil corporations.
3. Tax Avoidance Through Profit Transfers
In the international oil industry, many transactions take place
between related affiliates of vertically integrated companies. The
'companies, therefore, have an opportunity to manipulate internal
transaction prices and thus shift profits between countries in order to
minimize their total tax liabilities. As noted above, the "income taxes"
levied by the producing countries are based on the difference between
a fictitious gross revenue figure and production costs, where the rev-
enue figure equals the "posted price" times the quantity of pe-
troleum extracted. That method of taxation implies, however, that the
"income tax" collected by a producer country government will not
vary with changes in a company's recorded book revenue from extrac-
tion. Thus the effective marginal income tax rate in the producing
countries is zero. If the companies also have excess foreign tax credits
in calculating their U.S. tax liabilities on foreign-source income, the
total (U.S.-plus-foreign) marginal income tax rate is also zero. In this
situation, if a company can use fictitious internal transfer pricing to
shift any of its recorded profits from a country with a positive margin-
al income tax rate to one of the producing countries, it can avoid paying
taxes on those profits.
In principle, section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code forbids
profit transfers from the United States to foreign producing countries
by using internal prices which do not equal the market value of the
products transferred." In practice, the implementation of section 482
is another matter, especially against the background of the longstand-
ing acceptance as "income taxes" of taxes based on fictitious net in-
come figures. Statistical support has been provided for the existence
of profit transfers of the kind described here, from the major West
European consuming countries and Japan to the oil exporting
countries." The opportunity for similar profit transfers from the
United States, with accompanying revenue losses to the U.S. Treasury,
has grown in the 1970's, with the increase in American oil imports.
The restrictions in TRA on the use of "posted prices" do not
apply to intra-company transfers of crude oil. Therefore TRA will not
effectively limit the practice of fictitious transfers of profits to avoid
taxes. What is perhaps worse, TRA actually contains an incentive for
firms to attempt such transfers. Under the percentage limitation on
foreign tax credits, each dollar of profit transferred from a consum-
" The United States Treasury has cited section 482 as the reason the provisions in
TRA prohibiting the use of "posted prices" in certain transactions (see subsection III.A.
above) are not expected to raise any U.S. tax revenue (Treasury submission to the Office of
Management and the Budget for the Fall Budget Review, 1975).
" Taxation of Income, supra note 68.
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ing country to a producing country will increase a company's allow-
able tax credits by more than it will increase its U.S. income tax liabil-
ity on the transferred profits. Here is a graphic illustration of the de-
sirability of confronting the income tax-royalty issue directly rather
than obliquely with a percentage limitation on foreign tax credits such
as is contained in TRA.
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